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Wheelchair Participation in Road
Racing:, A Right, Not a Privilege
One reason most of us become runners is that we prefer relying on
ourselves.
2
The past decade has witnessed a substantial increase in the number
of individuals participating in amateur athletics. Probably the best ex-
ample of this phenomenon has been the jogging craze that began in the
1970's. Increasing numbers of men, women and children, old and
young alike, have taken up running to obtain the physical,3 psychologi-
cal,4 and social' benefits of the sport.
Less well known, but equally widespread, has been the precipitous
rise in the number of physically disabled individuals competing in
wheelchair athletics.6 The wheelchair sports movement had its origin
in the many permanently disabled young veterans of World War II
who populated this nation's Veterans Administration hospitals in the
1. The term "road racing" will be used as a synonym for marathoning and other running
races conducted on public streets. The "marathon" is the pinnacle of all road races. The word
probably had its origin in the time of the ancient Greeks. The Persian landings at Marathon in
490 B.C. prompted the defending Athenians to dispatch Pheidippides, "a professional long-
distance runner," from Athens to Sparta (a distance of about 140 miles) to seek help from the
Spartan government. See HERODorus, THE HIsToRIEs, BOOK VI 425 (De Selincourt ed. and tr.
1965). Pheidippides "reached Sparta the day after he left Athens." Id The marathon as a form
of racing is of modem origin, dating from 1896. See Response to Petition for Hearing at 10, New
York Roadrunners Club v. Division of Human Rights, 81 A.D.2d 519, 437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981).
The word "marathon" usually connotes a 26-mile, 385-yard running race.
2. THE RUNNER, Feb. 1982, at 50 (quotation by Bill Rodgers, currently the fifth ranked
male road racer). Rodgers has the seventh fastest marathon time ever recorded. THE RUNNER,
Jan. 1982, at 80. J. FDcx, THE COMPLEE RUNNER's DAY-BY-DAY LOG AND CALENDAR (quote
from week of Jan. 18-24 94th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as FIXX].
3. Running and other forms of aerobic exercise have been shown to bring about a number
of beneficial cardiovascular changes that include a lower pulse rate, increased mechanical effi-
ciency of the heart and protection from heart disease. See J. FARQUHAR, THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LiFE NEED NOT BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALT 83-84 (1978).
4. Running has been shown to reduce stress. Id One study has shown that regular running
reduced the levels of aggressive behavior in emotionally disturbed children. See Barnes, Child's
Play Proving that Running Can Help Emotionally Disturbed Kids, THE RUNNER, Feb. 1982, at 16.
5. Increasingly, athletics has become a dominant factor in the socialization process. Ac-
cording to one source:
Sport permeates any number of levels of contemporary society and it touches upon and
deeply influences such disparate elements as status, race relations ... the concept of the
hero... ethical values. For better or worse, it gives form and substance to much in
American life.
R. BOYLE, SPORT. MIRROR OF AMERICAN LiFE 3-4 (1963).
6. The California Wheelchair Athletic Association (hereinafter referred to as the C.W.A.A.)
has 260 members who compete in the following sports: track and field, table tennis, tennis, weigh-
tlifting, archery, road racing, basketball and bowling.
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late 1940's.7 These individuals invented the sport of wheelchair basket-
ball and initiated the organization of the sport in community settings. 8
The phenomenon of mass participation in organized road racing has
not gone unnoticed by the wheelchair population, which has partici-
pated alongside of able-bodied athletes in numerous races.9 The evolu-
tion of wheelchair road racing has shown that the training demands of
wheelchair sports are comparable to those required of the able-bodied
athlete. 10 Wheelchair athletes, like their ambulatory counterparts, un-
dergo rigorous training to prepare for road racing events, thereby ex-
periencing the same psychological and physical benefits that accrue to
non-disabled athletes from a daily training regimen. Their training de-
mands and desire for competition, similarly extend year-round;"I how-
ever, the limited number of competitions that are currently provided
for disabled athletes is inadequate to meet the increasing demand for
organized athletic competition.2
Coterminous with the growing number of wheelchair athletes desir-
ing to participate in running events is the increasing number of in-
stances when their participation is denied by individual race directors.
Recently litigation has resulted in New York concerning the decision of
7. See NATIONAL WHEELCHAIR ATHLETIC COMMITTEE, WHEELCHAIR ATHLETES AND
ROAD RACES-A POSITION PAPER 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as POSITION PAPER].
8. Id The subsequent development of wheelchair sports in Europe and elsewhere has made
the goal of increasing available athletic opportunities for the disabled a universal movement. In
the United States, the Special Olympics for the handicapped has been the most widely supported
organized athletic event for school-age children.
9. See notes 110-111 and accompanying text infra.
10. This point was established by Bob Hall of Boston, Massachusetts, who trained for the
1975 Boston Marathon by
pushing [his wheelchair] a ten (10) mile distance daily, [and] was later able to distinguish
himself by finishing the 26 mile 385 yard distance in well under the three hour limit
which qualified him for receipt of a certificate from the organizing committee acknowl-
edging this feat.
POSITION PAPER, supra note 7, at 1. The long-range consequence of Hall's performance was to
popularize the sport among wheelchair athletes, leading to their increased participation in long-
distance running. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 7, at I.
11. The extension of the wheelchair sports movement to include long-distance and short-
distance road racing has provided wheelchair athletes with a readily available source of exercise
and competition in an organized setting. Wheelchair participation in road racing has increased
steadily, in part because of the present paucity of other oganized athletic events available to the
physically disabled. Currently, two organizations, the National Wheelchair Athletic Association
(hereinafter referred to as N.W.A.A.) and the National Wheelchair Basketball Association (here-
inafter referred to as N.W.B.A.), comprise the entire structure of organized wheelchair athletics in
the United States. These two organizations have been unable to meet the current demand for
organized wheelchair athletic competition for the reason that the number of physically disabled
persons in the United States wanting to engage in some form of organized competition is simply
too large. In California alone there are approximately one and a half million disabled persons
between the ages of 16 and 64. The term "disabled," in the California Disability Survey, refers to
persons who are limited in their performance of major social roles by enduring physical and/or
mental impairments. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FOR THE CALIFORNIA DISABILITY SURVEY 3 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as DISABILITY SUR-
VEY]. Thirty-eight percent of these individuals are limited in walking. Id at Table ES-8.
12. See note 1l supra.
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the race director 13 to prevent wheelchair athletes from competing in the
annual New York City Marathon, a privately-operated competition
and the largest marathon road race in the United States. "
4 In New York
Roadrunner's Club v. State Division of Human Rights'I the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of wheelchair participation
from the New York City Marathon. Similar discrimination against
wheelchair athletes by race directors in California would result in the
exclusion of a large percentage of the physically disabled population of
the United States from an otherwise readily available form of physical
activity and competition.' 6 The decisions of private race directors to
exclude qualified wheelchair athletes cannot be reconciled with existing
federal and state constitutional and statutory guarantees prohibiting
discrimination against handicapped 17 individuals.
One of these guarantees is Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.18 This section prohibits discrimination against "qualified" hand-
icapped persons 9 participating in programs receiving "federal financial
assistance."' This comment will demonstrate that Section 504 applies
to road racing conducted on public streets. In addition, the comment
will show that the exclusion of wheelchair participation in road racing
violates both state and federal equal protection guarantees, as well as
California Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1 entitling handicapped per-
sons to full and equal access to places to which the general public is
invited'.2  Finally, it will be demonstrated that an attempt to judicially
enforce the right to participate under existing law, while a useful in-
terim approach, will produce inconsistent results due to uncertainty in
the application of the law. Moreover, the adoption of a case-by-case
13. The decision to exclude wheelchair participation was contrary to the wishes of the Mayor
of New York. See Mayor Edward I. Koch, Press Release, No. 324, October 14, 1978.
14. In 1980 there were some 16,000 entrants: 1,103 were fifty and older and nineteen were
over seventy years of age. See FLxx, supra note 2 (introductory paragraph to month of August).
15. 81 A.D.2d 519,437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981) (cited here with particular reference to the appel-
late court opinion).
16. There are an estimated 3.4 million handicapped, noninstitutionalized persons living
throughout the nation. See CALIFORNIA STATE PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT DISABILITIES SERVICES
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1981 §2 at 5. In California, as of 1980, there were approximately one and
one-half million disabled persons between the ages of 16 and 64 in the civilian household popula-
tion. See DISABILITY SURVEY, supra note 11, at 2.
17. A handicapped person, for the purpose of applying the federal anti-discrimination stat-
ute, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Rehabilitation Act], is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 45 C.F.R. §84.30) (1980). The Code of Federal
Regulations defines "major life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Id
§84.3(2)(ii).
18. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976).
19. See notes 66-93 and accompanying text infrm.
20. See notes 23-40 and accompanying text infra.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54, 54.1.
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approach by the courts in providing a remedy for discrimination
against handicapped athletes in road racing would not serve adequately
the interests of wheelchair participants, who desire greater standardiza-
tion of procedures for their participation in road races.22
This comment will first discuss the necessary requirements for im-
posing liability under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and then
apply those standards to wheelchair participation in road racing to de-
termine if liability should be imposed on the discriminatory conduct of
race directors.
A FEDERAL STATUTORY GUARANTEE OF THE
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197323 provides that quali-
fied handicapped persons may not be discriminated against in any fed-
erally funded program or service, whether public or private.2 a
Specifically, the statute states that
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of
handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity that receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.
25
The application of the statutory prohibition of section 504 to road
racing events conducted on public streets hinges on the statutory and
judicial interpretations of the terms "receiving federal financial assist-
ance" and "otherwise qualified handicapped person."
22. Telephone interview with Phil Carpenter, President of the International Wheelchair Ath-
letic Association [hereinafter referred to as I.W.A.A.], January 7, 1982 (notes on file at the Pacfc
Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Phone Conversation with Phil Carpenter].
23. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976).
24. Id
25. 45 C.F.R. §84.4(a) (1981). California has a similar statute that prohibits discrimination
against qualified persons with developmental disabilities under any program or activity that re-
ceives public funds. California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 4502 states that
no otherwise qualified person by reason of having a developmental disability shall be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity, which receives public funds.
The term "developmental disability" is defined in the California Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 4512(a) to include any
disability [which] originates before an individual attains age 18, continues, or can be
expected to continue, indefinitely, and constitutes a substantial handicap for such indi-
vidual.... Mhis term shall include mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and
autism. This term shall also include handicapping conditions found to be closely related
to mental retardation or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally re-
tarded individuals, but shall not include other handicapping conditions that are solely
physical in nature.
In most situations the California statute would not apply to wheelchair athletes seeking to partici-
pate in road racing, for their disabilities are usually only physical in nature.
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A. Liability under Section 504
This section will discuss the three essential requirements for impos-
ing liability under section 504 and determine whether those require-
ments are met with respect to discrimination against wheelchair
athletes in road racing. Liability under section 504 is imposed on any
public or private person or entity that discriminates against handi-
capped individuals if that person or entity is (1) receiving or benefit-
ting from federal financial assistance; (2) discriminating against
handicapped individuals that are "qualified" to participate in the pro-
gram or activity under question; and, (3) failing to make the program
"accessible" to handicapped persons.
. Dening the Term, 'Receiving Federal Financial Assistance"
The term "receiving federal financial assistance" has been given a
broad interpretation both in the section 504 regulations26 promulgated
by the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter
D.H.H.S.) and in judicial opinions.2 7 The term is defined in federal
regulations to include:
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a
contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by
which the [federal agency] provides or otherwise makes available
assistance in the form of (1) funds; (2) services of federal personnel;
or (3) real and personal property .... 28
There is no doubt that the State of California and its political subdivi-
sions receive a substantial amount of federal funding for economic and
social programs,29 including general assistance for state programs30 and
federal grants for specific projects like highway construction and im-
provements.3 In order to impose liability on a public or private entity
that does not receive federal funding directly, however, it is necessary
to determine the scope of the term "receiving federal financial assist-
26. See 45 C.F.R. App. A, pt. 84, No. 2 (1980). The Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare [hereinafter referred to as H.E.W.] stated that institutions receiving Medicaid funds are
considered "recipients" of federal financial assistance. Id
27. A vast majority of the decisions tend to support the notion that the use of any federal
money in an institution, is sufficient to establish the receipt of federal funds for the purpose of
applying Section 504. The requirements are somewhat more stringent in determining whether the
receipt of federal funding is sufficient to qualify the recipient as a federal or state actor. See 5
MENTAL DISABILITy L. REP. 141 (1981). The United States Supreme Court, in Norwood v. Harri-
son, 413 U.S. 455 (1975) indicated that it would find state action in the receipt of federal funds
when there is "tangible financial aid. . . that. . . has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce
and support private discrimination." Id at 466.
28. 45 C.F.R. §84.3(h) (1980).
29. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text infra.
30. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text infra.
1121
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 13
ance." The first element in this determination is whether a person or
entity qualifies as a recipient of federal funds.
A "recipient" of federal financial assistance is defined to include any
private persons or entities that receive or benefit from federal financial
assistance. 2 Under federal regulations, the status of a person or entity
as a recipient applies to all programs, services or activities conducted
by that person or entity, not to the specific program or programs to
which the federal money is allocated.33 This statutory interpretation is
supported by a majority of court decisions,34 exemplified by the New
Jersey federal district court decision in Poole v. South Plainfield Board
of Education." In Poole, a student born with one kidney sought com-
pensatory damages from the South Plainfield Board of Education cit-
ing the Board's decision denying him the right to participate in high
school interscholastic wrestling because of his handicap. 6 The court
held that the provisions of section 504 were applicable to the interscho-
lastic athletic activities of a school system receiving federal funding
even if none of the federal funds were specifically spent on interscho-
lastic athletics. 37 The court deemed illogical that Congress would have
intended to ban discrimination during school hours but not in the
course of school-sponsored extracurricular activities.38 The court based
its position on the fact that federal aid to any program in a school sys-
tem releases local money for other uses, thus benefitting those pro-
grams that are not direct beneficiaries of the federal aid.39
32. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976). The Office of Revenue Sharing, United States Department of
Treasury Regulations provides that
any entity which receives funds by grant, contract, or other arrangement for the purpose
of providing a service the recipient government would otherwise provide .. is a "sec-
ondary recipient."
See OFFICE OF REVENUE SHARING, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY REGULATIONS.
The definition includes private nonprofit organizations that receive revenue sharing funds and use
them in a manner that impacts on the citizens of the primary recipient government. Id The Code
of Federal Regulations defines a recipient as
any state or its political subdivision, (or instrumentality thereof), any public or private
agency, institution, organization, or other entity, or any person to which federal financial
assistance is extended directly, or through another recipient including any successor, as-
signee or transferee of a recipient ....
33. 45 C.F.R. §84.3(f) (1980). For example, a program of a college history department itself
receives none of the college's federal support. See FEDERAL PROGRAMS ADVISORY SERVICE,
HANDICAPPED REQUiREMENTS HANDBOOK 305, at 1 (1980).
34. See note 27 supra.
35. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
36. Id at 948.
37. Id at 951. The court noted that it was clear from Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions Section 84.31 that the regulations of Section 84.37 of the Code, dealing with the right of a
handicapped student to participate in the physical education and athletic activities of the school,
are applicable to a recipient even though the funds received are not for the specific program
involved in the handicapped person's claims. Id The Code specifies: "In providing physical
education courses and athletics and similar programs and activities to any of its students, a recipi-
ent . . may not discriminate on the basis of handicap." 45 C.F.R. §84.37(c)(1) (1980).
38. 490 F. Supp. at 951.
39. Id
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In addition, the D.H.H.S. Regulations implementing section 504 pro-
hibit cities and other local political entities from perpetuating discrimi-
nation by providing "significant assistance" to any organization or
person that discriminates on the basis of handicap.' A related provi-
sion also precludes any recipient from providing significant assistance
to a community recreational group or social organization that discrimi-
nates against handicapped persons. 41 The latter regulation suggests
that the following two criteria be applied to determine whether "signifi-
cant assistance" has been provided:
(1) The relationship between the recipient and the other entity in-
cluding financial support, and (2) whether the other entity's activities
relate so closely to the recipient's activity that they should fairly be
considered the activities of the recipient itself.42
The holding of a Texas Federal District Court in Doe v. Marshall,4 3
though it did not specifically refer to the significant assistance standard,
is useful in determining when the "significant assistance" requirement
will be met. In Marshall, the court held that a state high school athletic
association policy that prohibited students from participating in varsity
sports if their parents or guardians did not reside in the same school
district, violated the requirement of section 504 that the school district
evaluate individually the educational needs of each handicapped
child.44 Significantly, the court found that the delegation of rule-mak-
ing authority from the school district to the private independent regula-
tory body would directly subject the latter to the section 504 individual
evaluation requirement.45 Although not made explicit in the text of the
opinion, it appeared that the mere transfer of rule-making authority
from the "recipient" school district to the private athletic commission
was sufficient enough to be considered significant assistance.4 6
Road racing events conducted on public streets are subject to the
nondiscrimination provisions of section 504 when a state, local political
unit, private organization or person receives federal financial assistance
and either conducts the race or provides significant assistance to the
40. 45 C.F.R. §85.51(b)(1)(v) (1980).
41. Id. App. A, pt. 84, No. 6 (1980).
42. Id
43. 459 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
44. See id at 1191-92. The purpose of the high school policy was to prevent member high
school athletic teams from recruiting student athletes from other school districts. The court found
that the application of this school policy in the present case, where the plaintiffexhibited a need to
live with his grandparents because of his psychological problems, would unlawfully conflict with
the section 504 requirement that the educational needs of a handicapped student be assessed
individually.
45. Seeid at 1192.
46. Id See notes 32-51 and accompanying text supra.
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public or private entity conducting the race.47 These standards will be
applied to determine the applicability of section 504 to road racing in
California.
California realizes a benefit from federal financial assistance in the
form of federal aid for specific projects and in general assistance for
welfare and other public expenditures. 48 In addition, California re-
ceives federal funding for highway construction and safety improve-
ments under the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970 and 1973, 49 the
Highway Safety Acts of 197350 and the Urban Mass Transportation Act
of 1964.51 The majority of the funds allocated from the Treasury to the
Federal Highway Commission under these specific federal programs
are distributed to each state on the basis of total population52 or of the
ratio that the area of the state bears to the total area of all states. 3
California receives a large portion of this federal aid, which is
earmarked for the specific purpose of highway construction and
improvements.
In addition, California receives federal funding for welfare and other
expenditures through the revenue-sharing provisions of fiscal assistance
to state and local governments. 54 Congress has expressed its intent that
these revenue-sharing funds be subject to the express congressional
proviso that they not be used in a manner that subjects "persons" to
discrimination: Section 1242 of the Revenue Sharing Act provides
that, with regard to these funds,
no person ... shall ... be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity of a state government or unit of local government
which receives funds under [this chapter]. 55
This section further specifies that section 504 shall also prohibit dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving revenue-sharing
funds. 6 Thus, unless California and its political subdivisions can show
47. See notes 26-46 and accompanying text supra.
48. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
49. 23 U.S.C. §§101-156 (1976).
50. Id §§401-407 (1976).
51. 49 U.S.C. §§1601-1613 (1976).
52. Under the Federal Highway Safety Act, 75 percent of the available funds are allocated on
the basis of population. See 23 U.S.C. §402(c) (1976). The Urban Mass Transportation Act allo-
cates 85 percent of the available funds to urbanized areas with populations of 750,000 or more.
See 49 U.S.C. §1604(b) (1976).
53. After selection of the specfic projects that will receive assistance under the Federal Aid
Highways Act, the remainder of the fund is distributed according to a formula which calculates
the ratio of each state's area to the total area of all states, and the ratio of each state's rural
population to the rural populations of all states. See 23 U.S.C. §104(b) (1976).
54. 31 U.S.C. §1221 (1976).
55. Id §1242 (1976).
56. Id The exact wording of the statute is as follows:
This section encompasses the prohibition of discrimination against otherwise qualified
1124
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by clear and convincing evidence that they do not receive revenue-
sharing funds, they are subject to the provisions of sections 1242 and
504, prohibiting discrimination against qualified handicapped individ-
uals by any recipient. 7 Any private entity that receives significant
assistance from the recipient state is also subject to the prohibitions of
section 504.8
Since California and its political subdivisions are clearly recipients of
revenue-sharing funds and other forms of federal financial assistance,
the inquiry turns to whether the scope of California's recipient status
includes road racing conducted on public streets and whether signifi-
cant assistance is provided to the entities that organize and conduct
these events.
First, under Poole, the requirements of section 504 apply to road
races conducted on public streets, although the state or local political
unit only indirectly allocates to the race any funding, services, or prop-
erty received from the federal government. 9 Poole dictates that Cali-
fornia may not aid or perpetuate discrimination against qualified
handicapped persons by providing significant assistance to race direc-
tors who discriminate against qualified wheelchair athletes.60 Second,
"significant assistance" by a recipient of federal funds to a nonrecipient
is clearly established in the symbiotic relationship between the race di-
rectors and the cities in the operation of most road races. The Sacra-
mento Marathon, which is typical of large-scale road races in its
preparation planning,6 is aided by the city police in providing traffic
and crowd control and erecting barriers to restrain the flow of car traf-
fic. The city fire department provides paramedics to aid those who
need assistance during the race.
The foregoing are only a few of the circumstances that compel the
conclusion that the activities of race directors and race committees can
fairly be characterized as the activities of the cities themselves, thereby
satisfying the significant assistance requirement of section 504. In Mar-
shall, the use of the school facilities by the high school athletic regula-
tory body was sufficient to subject that private organization to the
handicapped persons as provided in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....
The statute shall apply where the state or local program is funded in whole or in part by
subtitle A.
57. Id
58. See 31 C.F.RL §51.51(i) (1980).
59. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
60. See notes 39-46 and accompanying text supra.
61. The Sacramento race organization is typical except insofar as the event has undergone
changes in the original course to accomodate wheelchair participation. Telephone interview with
John McIntosh, Race Director for Sacramento Marathon, October 10, 1981 (notes on file at the
Pacfc Law Journal).
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requirements of section 504.62 In the road race situation the use of pub-
lic facilities, including streets, police and fire departments, is not the
only manner in which the activities of the race organizers could be
characterized as those of the city. Running events like the Sacramento
Marathon are a convenient forum for inviting community involvement
and participation on a wide scale. The running events attract out-of-
town, and possibly out-of-state, participants and spectators, providing a
direct benefit to cities in the form of increased tourism. The races also
are conducive to the advertisement of various other city events and
services. Moreover, they are a source of public education, in that many
of the larger races conduct pre-race seminars on a variety of topics of
interest to both runners and the general public, including running
equipment, training techniques, and the benefits of cardio-vascular ex-
ercise to health and nutrition. In Poole, a recipient of federal funds
was held subject to section 504 constraints even as to those programs
for which federal funds were not specifically earmarked,63 on the basis
that all of the recipient's programs received a benefit, either directly or
indirectly, from the funding.' Road races directly benefit state and
local programs by providing a source of community recreation, sociali-
zation and public education. They are also an important source of rev-
enue.65 Public funds, including funds acquired by federal financial
assistance, that would have been spent for the above purposes but for
the popularity of local road races, are thereby diverted to other uses.
Thus, even if cities or local political units do not allocate any part of
their federal funds to locally conducted road races, the events are still
subject to section 504 based on the significant assistance provided by
the recipient city to the private race directors and the city's resulting
ability to divert resources from city-operated public recreation to other
programs.
2. What constitutes an otherwise qualfied handicapped person?
The second requirement for liability under section 504 is that the
individual complaining of discrimination be "qualified" to participate
in the recipient's program. An "otherwise qualified handicapped per-
son" is defined by federal regulations as "a handicapped person who
meets the essential eligibility requirements" with respect to the services
62. See Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
63. See Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.N.J. 1980).
64. Id at 951.
65. In addition to providing an eager population of consumers for local supermarkets, restau-
rants, and running and clothing stores, running events are an Important source of revenue for
many charitable causes. One runner, Terry Fox, ran 3,339 miles across Canada with an artificial
leg to raise $20 million for the Canadian Cancer Society. See Ferstle, Warm Ups, THE RUNNER,
Sept. 1981, at 10.
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offered by the recipient.6 6 The United States Supreme Court defined
the term in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,67 stating that
"[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 68 In Davis, a woman
who suffered from a serious hearing disability was denied admission to
a registered nurse training program because of her hearing disability.
69
The Court found that a woman suffering from a serious hearing disa-
bility was not able to meet the legitimate requirements of a clinical
nursing program.70 Expert testimony revealed that the ability to under-
stand speech without reliance on lipreading was necessary for a pa-
tient's safety during the clinical phase of the program.71 The Court's
conclusion hinged on an application of Title 45, section 84.3(k)(3), of
the Code of Federal Regulations, which defines a qualified handi-
capped person with respect to postsecondary education programs as
one meeting both "academic and technical standards. ' 72  The term
"technical standards" includes "all nonacademic admissions criteria
that are essential to participation in the program in question. ' 73 The
Court interpreted this language as providing that a program may re-
quire applicants to possess physical qualifications necessary for partici-
pation in the program74 for the Statute (504) does not require
affirmative action to accomodate individuals who do not possess such
qualifications.7' In Davis, the nursing program would have been
forced to alter significantly the structure of its programs to accomodate
66. 45 C.F.R. §84.3(k)(4) (1980).
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
68. Id at 406. The term "otherwise" was eliminated from the final Department of Health
and Human Services (hereinafter referred to as D.H.H.S.) Agency Regulations because the De-
partment believed that the deletion was necessary to comport with the intent of the statute: read
literally, "otherwise" qualified handicapped persons could connote handicapped persons who are
qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. See 45 C.F.R. App. A,
pt. 84, No. 5 (1980).
69. 442 U.S. at 402.
70. Id at 413.
71. Id at 403, 407. The District Court, in Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F.
Supp. 1341, 1343 (1976), found that in certain situations, such as in the operating room where the
doctors wear masks, lipreading would be impossible and commands could not therefore be com-
municated between the respondent and the doctors. The circumstances underlying wheelchair
participation in road racing do not encounter similar safety risks. The case of New York Roadrun-
ners Club v. Division ofHnuman Rights elicited only one instance of a collision between a runner
and a wheelchair racer during the 1978 New York Marathon. The incident occurred when a foot
racer, frightened by a spectator darting onto the race course, swerved into a wheelchair. The foot
racer withdrew from the competition but did not seek medical attention. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae at 27, New York Roadrunners Club v. Div. of Human Rights, 81 A.D.2d 519, 437
N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981).
72. 442 U.S. at 404, 406. See 45 C.F.R. App. A, pt. 84, No. 5 (1980).
73. 45 C.F.R. App. A, pt. 84, No. 5 (1980).
74. 442 U.S. at 406. The only physical qualification for competing in most locally conducted
road races is the participant's certification that he or she is physically fit and has trained suffi-
ciently for the distance of the race.
75. Id at 411.
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the hearing disabled plaintiff.76 "/Flundamental alteration[s] in the na-
ture" of a program to accommodate handicapped persons are not le-
gally required. 7" Nevertheless, some failure of accomodation, not
requiring "undue financial and administrative burdens," might be un-
reasonably discriminatory,78 for there is a fine line between "a lawful
refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination. ' 79 The
Davis court specified that when "technological advances could be ex-
pected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped,"
80
and when attainment of these goals could be realized without imposing
undue financial and administrative burdens on the recipient, it might
be unreasonable discrimination to disallow participation.81 The Court
also noted that the possession of a handicap may not affect the individ-
uars actual capacity in a particular context.82 A person may possess
certain limiting physical characteristics or mental impairment but ne-
gate those limitations with other abilities that would enable the individ-
ual to satisfy program requirements.83 The Court thus concluded that
possession of a handicap, in and of itself, could not be used as a justifi-
cation for excluding handicapped participation.
84
In the recent decision of Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colo-
rado,85 a federal district court found, after examining the language of
Davis, that when no particular physical qualification is essential to par-
ticipation in a program, a handicapped person is otherwise qualified if
the person is able to meet all of the requirements of the program de-
spite the handicap. 6 In Pushkin a medical doctor, confined to a wheel-
chair because of multiple sclerosis, was denied admission to a
psychiatric residency program because of his handicap.87 The court
76. Id at 407, 408. Indeed, the plaintiff suggested that she be given "individual supervision
by faculty members whenever she attend[ed] patients directly," an exemption from taking certain
required courses, and training so that she could "undertake all the tasks [that] a registered nurse islicensed to perform." Id at 407-08.
77. 442 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). The Court in Davis found that a program of study in
registered nursing would have to undergo substantial 
alterations to accomodate a deaf t ent.
Id
78. Id
79. Id at 412.80. Id The accomplishments of wheelchair athletes in road racing have translated into de-
sign changes in the chairs themselves to make them lighter and more stable for road racing. See
PosrrnoN PAPER, .supra note 7, at 1.
81. 442 U.S. at4O.
r2. Id at 405, 406 n6. In fact, individuals "regarded as having an impairment may at pres-
ent have no actual in capacity at all" Id at 406.
83. Id at 406. This is the case in wheelchair road racing, where the only significant differ-
ence between the wheelchair racers and their able-bodied counterparts is in the mode of negotiat-
ing the race course.
84. Id at 405.
85. 504 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Colo. 1981).
76. Id at 1298.
87. Id at 1299. Multiple sclerosis is medically defined as a disease and legislatively defined
as a severe handicap. See 29 U.S.C. §706(13) (1976).
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found that the doctor's physical limitations would not have required
substantial modifications in the residency program, and that he was,
therefore, discriminated against solely by reason of his handicap. 8
The court in Pushkin noted that adjustments that had been previously
implemented in the residency program for other handicapped appli-
cants could readily accomodate the plaintiff and that further modifica-
tions could easily be made:
89
Adjustments that have been made for other handicapped residents
include placing the resident on part-time load and extending the resi-
dency term, adjusting patient load, modifying curriculum schedules,
reducing night call duty, placing at nearby rather than distant hospi-
tals for duty, allowing wheelchair use ... 9
The Pushkin court found that, based on the plaintiffs demonstration of
his ability to deal with patients in the clinical setting and his satisfac-
tory completion of the "objective" admissions criteria, he was other-
wise qualified despite his handicap.91
In summary, a handicapped person is qualified to participate in a
recipient's program if the disabled individual fulfills the essential quali-
fications, including physical qualifications, of the program.92 Thus, a
handicapping condition, in and of itself, will not preclude a handi-
capped person from participating in a recipient's program if, because of
the handicapped person's other abilities, or those abilities coupled with
technological advances, the handicapped person could participate in
the recipient's program without requiring "fundamental" alterations in
the program. 93 The next section will discuss the degree to which a re-
cipient's program must be made accessible to a qualified handicapped
person short of requiring "fundamental" alterations. In particular, it
will be illustrated that program accessibility in road racing can be
achieved without requiring "fundamental" alterations in the nature of
the event. In addition, it will be shown that providing separate compe-
88. 504 F. Supp. at 1295.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id at 1298-99. A handicapped person must satisfy both the "academic" and "technical"
standards of a recipient postsecondary education program to be eligible to participate in that
program. The term "technical standards" refers to all nonacademic admissions criteria including
subjective criteria of evaluation. See 45 C.F.R. App. A, pt. 84, No. 5 (1980). The Davis court
interpreted the H.E.W. provision to include legitimate physical qualifications among those non-
academic admissions criteria that are essential to the particular program. See Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979). Yet in the absence of articulated standards
upon which a subjective assessment can be made of an applicant's ability to fulffl the essential
requirements of a program, the subjective assessment cannot be used to disqualify the applicant.
See 504 F. Supp. at 1298.
92. See notes 66-91 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 79-91 and accompanying text supra.
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titions for wheelchair competitors violates the program accessibility
requirement.
3. Program Accessibility as the Key to Section 504 Compliance
The Supreme Court in Davis did not attempt to standardize the situ-
ations in which a recipient's refusal to undergo modifications of pro-
gram standards to accomodate a handicapped person would constitute
discrimination; indeed, this would have been contrary to the expressed
intent of Congress that each recipient examine its own program and
make the program "in its entirety, ...readily accessible to handi-
capped persons." 94 A general requirement of accessibility is, however,
stated in the Code of Federal Regulations:
No qualified handicapped person shall, because a recipient's facili-
ties are inaccessible to or unusable by handicapped persons, be de-
nied the benefits of, be excluded from participation in, or otherwise
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity .... 9
A recipient is not required to make each program or service accessible
to qualified handicapped persons if its program as a whole is accessi-
ble.96 Program accessibility requires that handicapped individuals be
given an equal opportunity to achieve equal results as nonhandicapped
persons.97 These general requirements are extended to physical educa-
tion and athletic programs offered by federally funded education
programs:
In providing physical education courses and athletics and similar
programs and activities to any of its students, a recipient ... may
not discriminate on the basis of handicap .... A recipient that
offers physical education courses or that sponsors interscholastic,
club, or intramural athletics shall provide to qualified handicapped
students an equal opportunity for participation in these activities.9"
94. 45 C.F.R. §§84.21-84.23 (1980) (general program accessibility requirements). Federal
regulations under Section 504 require each recipient to maintain on file a self-evaluation of all of
its programs and activities. See HANDBOOK, supra note 33 at 1101 at 2. In addition, employers
must provide "reasonable accomodation" to handicapped employees, taking into account the
"known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant, unless the
recipient can demonstrate that the accomodation would impose an undue hardship on the opera-
tion of its program." See 45 C.F.R. §84.12(a) (1980).
95. 45 C.F.R. §84.21 (1980) (emphasis added).
96. Id §84.22(a).
97. Id §§85.51(b)(1)(ii), (iii).
98. Id §§84.37(c)(1), 84.47(a)(1). The fact that the Code of Federal Regulations mentions
only athletics and nonacademic extracurricular activities in those subparts dealing with federally
funded education does not imply that a recipient who is not an educational institution need not
abide by the general program accessibility standard. The specification of athletic activities with
regard to education is indicative of the realization by the D.H.H.S. of the importance of athletic
and extracurricular activities in the educational setting, and in the students' socialization process.
The courts too have recognized the importance of athletics in an individual's development. Sce,
eg., Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 952-54 (D.N.J. 1980); Doe v. Mar-
shall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1191-92 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
1130
1982 / Wheelchair Participation in Road Racing
In addition, federal regulations provide that priority shall be given
"to those methods that offer programs and activities to handicapped
persons in the most integrated setting appropriate." 99 Thus, separate
services shall not be used unless necessary to afford handicapped indi-
viduals equally effective benefits. 10° The D.H.H.S. Regulations also
provide that, despite the existence of separate or different programs or
activities, a qualified handicapped person may not be denied the equal
opportunity to participate in programs that are not separate or differ-
ent.101 In sum, the regulations adopted by the D.H.H.S. require that a
recipient's program be accessible, 0 2 offer equal participation in equally
effective programs, °3 and allow individuals to participate in programs
that are not separate or different, but are subject to only those modifica-
tions or adjustments that are required to ensure full participation.' °
Under the general accessibility standard of section 504, a recipient's
programs must be accessible to handicapped persons who meet the es-
sential eligibility requirements of the recipient's program despite their
handicaps.'l" As discussed above, an additional requirement of pro-
gram accessibility is that these programs or services be offered in the
most appropriate integrated setting. I°6 Davis limits this general re-
quirement only to the extent that a recipient need not undergo substan-
tial modifications or fundamental alterations in its program, or incur
undue financial and administrative burdens in achieving program
accessibility. 1
0 7
Under Davis, the exclusion of wheelchair athletes from participation
in road racing would constitute unreasonable discrimination. 08 Wheel-
chair road racers are qualified to compete in road racing despite their
handicap. For example, the requirements for entering the Sacramento
Marathon are limited to: (1) completing the entry form, (2) paying the
required fee on time, (3) being over 12 years of age, (4) certifying
one's physical fitness and sufficient training to complete the distance,
and (5) verifying this medical condition through a doctor's state-
ment. 0 9 The fitness criterion is not a bar, in that wheelchair athletes
99. 45 C.F.R. §84.22(b) (1980).
100. Id § 85.51(b)(1) (iv).
101. Id §84.4(3). The Code of Federal Regulations (ritle 45, Sections 84.37(c)(2) and
84.47(a)(2) (1980)) provides that a recipient may offer separate athletic activities for students only
if "no qualified handicapped student is denied the opportunity to compete for teams or to partici-
pate in courses that are not separate or different."
102. 45 C.F.R. §84.22(a) (1980).
103. Id §§85.51(b)(I)(ii), (iii).
104. See generally id §85.51 (1980) (general prohibitions against discrimination).
105. See notes 66-92 and accompanying text supra.
106. 45 C.F.R. §84.22(b) (1980).
107. See notes 67-84 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 75-93 and accompanying text upra.
109. Not every runner receives a physical before the race. Those that desire a physician's
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who compete in road racing events put in comparable training to that
of their able-bodied counterparts in preparation for road racing
events." 0 Furthermore, these road races could easily be made accessi-
ble to wheelchair competitors without requiring substantial modifica-
tion of the event, and without incurring undue financial or
administrative burdens. Many wheelchair racers have competed safely
in numerous long and short distance road running events."' Because
accessibility is not a problem in road racing conducted on paved
streets, no substantial modifications would be necessary to accomodate
wheelchairs in that instance." 2 Any accomodations sought by wheel-
chair athletes would be consistent with the interests of foot runners
themselves, who desire obstacle-free race courses in the interest of
faster times and lesser chance of injury.
In addition to the general requirement of accessibility of a recipient's
program to qualified handicapped persons is the requirement that the
recipient achieve this program accessibility "in the most integrated set-
ting appropriate.""' 3 Conducting separate events for wheelchair and
able-bodied participants would violate this and other provisions of sec-
tion 504 for several reasons. For instance, separate races would not
afford qualified handicapped persons an "equal opportunity" to
achieve equal results."' One of the major benefits provided by road
treatment for injury, or general advice on whether they are physically capable of completing the
race, may seek a doctor's verification. Under the rules promulgated by the N.W.A.A., each wheel-
chair athlete would be required to have a general medical examination for his or her own protec-
tion in order to compete safely. All wheelchair participants in the National Wheelchair Games,
for example, must have obtained medical permission to participate within two months of the com-
petition. See THE NATIONAL WHEELCHAIR ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION AND RULES,
§C-1.0, at 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as N.W.A.A. RULES].
110. See note 10 supra. The Mayor of New York, Edward I. Koch, made the following state-
ment on the issue of the inclusion of wheelchair competitors in the 1978 New York City
Marathon:
It is important to note that an emerging, exceptionally qualified, class of wheelchair com-
petitors is active in the United States today. The vigorous training and resultant ability
of these athletes, including both women and men, are equal to that of world-class foot-
runners, both at home and abroad.
See Press Release, supra note 13.
111. See note 71 and accompanying text infra. The I.W.A.A. has approximately 100 members.
Canada also has a large number of wheelchair road racers, and the President of the I.W.A.A., Phil
Carpenter, stated that he "recently was contacted by individuals in Nigeria interested in wheel-
chair road racing." The Orange Bowl Marathon in Florida had over fifty wheelchair participants
in 1981 and will have an expected 100 or more in 1982. See Phone Conversation with Phil Car-
penter, supra note 22.
112. The program accessibility standard might require the placement of ramps so that wheel-
chair participants would have a smoother ride over curbs. The wheelchair athletes, however, do
not advocate that all cross-country races be accessible. There are certain races conducted on rug-
ged terrain inaccessible to wheelchairs, for which exclusion of wheelchair participation would not
be unreasonable. Telephone interview with Dino Wallen, Vice President of the California Wheel-
chair Athletic Association, January 7, 1982 (notes on file at the Pac#/c Law Journal).
113. 45 C.F.R. §84.22(b) (1980).
114. Id §§85.51(b)(I)(ii), (iii). Competitive athletic events for able-bodied and wheelchair
athletes can take any one of three forms: segregated, parallel and mainstreamed. There are very
few athletic events that permit the wheelchair athlete and the non-disabled athlete to compete
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racing, to both the competitors and the general public, is an atmosphere
of community involvement. The level of community involvement
would necessarily be diminished if separate races were held involving
only the disabled community. In addition, providing separate treat-
ment would "demean the ability or social status of the affected
class," ' thus "substantially impairing the accomplishment of the
objectives of the activity with respect to handicapped persons."
1'1 6
Moreover, the operation of separate events, would be a needless and
senseless extravagance in that twice the resources would be required to
conduct the races. Wheelchair road racers themselves contend that
separately conducted races are undesirable." 7 They do not envision
racing against the runners for the purpose of competitive placement,
but "merely wish to use the activity and integrate into it.""' 8 The use of
segregated races, in any case, would be contrary to the regulation is-
sued by the D.H.H.S. that only those modifications necessary to
achieve equally effective benefits should be instituted by recipients." 9
In addition, the regulations provide that qualified handicapped persons
may not be denied the opportunity to participate in integrated pro-
grams, despite the existence of separate or different programs.' 20  Fi-
nally, the denial of equal access by qualified wheelchair participants to
road racing events would be contrary to the stated purpose of section
504 of providing equal benefits in the most integrated setting
appropriate.'
2 1
against one another on an equal basis (mainstreamed). One such event is archery, the second may
be table tennis, and the third is the bench press in weightlifting. Segregated events are those in
which everyone must be either standing or sitting in a wheelchair to permit equitable competition;
these include, e.g., basketball, football, softball, track and field. A parallel event is one in which
wheelchair athletes and standing athletes participate simultaneously, or practically so. In a paral-
lel event, however, wheelchair athletes compete only against wheelchair athletes and non-disabled
athletes compete only against non-disabled athletes for purposes of placement. Road racing is
easily conducted as a parallel event. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 7, at 2-3.
115. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979).
116. 45 C.F.R. §85.51(b)(1)(3) (1980).
A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize crite-
ria or methods of administration. . .(ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with
respect to handicapped persons ....
Id
117. See note 114 supra. The position of the N.W.A.A. is that road racing should be con-
ducted in a parallel fashion. Id
118. See Phone Conversation with Phil Carpenter, note 22 supra.
119. See 45 C.F.R. §85.51(b)(1)(ii) (1980); id App. A, pt. 84, No. 6.
120. Id §85.51(b)(2).
121. See id §§84.22(b), 85.51(b)(l)(ii), (iii). Indeed the policy of Congress is to mainstream
handicapped individuals into the community environment:
It is essential that recommendations be made to assure that all individuals with handi-
caps are able to live their lives independently and with dignity, and that complete inte-
gration of all individuals with handicaps into normal community living, working and
service patterns be held as the final objective.
White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, §301, 88 STAT.
1631 (1974).
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This comment thus far has shown the essential requirements for im-
posing section 504 liability are that (1) the program or activity "receive
federal financial assistance,"'" (2) the handicapped person be quali-
fied to participate in that program"z and (3) the program be conducted
in the "most integrated setting appropriate." 24 These criteria are im-
plicated by the exclusion of wheelchair competitors from road racing.
When "significant assistance" is provided by a recipient to a person or
entity that does not directly receive federal funding, the requirement of
"receiving federal financial assistance" is satisfied as to both parties.125
Wheelchair athletes are "qualified" to participate in these events de-
spite their handicaps, for they meet the essential criteria for participa-
tion and do not require substantial modifications in the race format.
26
Additionally, separate races would not afford the wheelchair athletes
equal benefits as non-disabled athletes.' 27 Next, this comment will ex-
amine the available remedies for a section 504 violation, and determine
whether they would adequately serve the interests of the wheelchair
athletes.
B. The Available Remedies for a Section 504 Violation
Section 504 provides an administrative procedure for cessation of
federal funding when a program recipient violates the terms of the stat-
ute, 128 but does not explicitly provide a remedy for the infringement of
individual rights.' 29 In interpreting section 504 in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis,30 the United States Supreme Court did not
decide whether a private right of action13 1 was available, or whether
the sole remedy provided for a section 504 violation was an administra-
tive cessation of funding to the discriminating program.'
32
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kling v. County of Los Ange-
les, 33 however has held that a private right of action exists under sec-
tion 504 and that administrative remedies need not be exhausted before
the private action may be brought.'3 4 The Kling court, following the
rationale of the Seventh Circuit set forth in Lloyd v. Regional Transpor-
122. See notes 26-65 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 67-93 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 99-121 and accompanying text supra.
125. See note 37 and accompanying 
text supra.
126. See notes 109-110 and accompanying text supra.
127. See notes 97-104 and accompanying text supra.
128. See 29 U.S.C. §794a(2) (1976 & Supp. 1978).
129. See Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
130. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
131. Id at 404, 405 n.5.
132. Id at 412-13.
133. 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980).
134. Id at 878-79.
1134
1982 / Wheelchair Paricpation in Road Racing
tation Authority,135 held that a private right of action existed under sec-
tion 504 by analogizing to the United States Supreme Court decisions
that found the existence of a private action under the comparable pro-
visions of Titles VI and IX.' 36 The Lloyd opinion used the four factors
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 37 under
which a private remedy was impliedly created by statute when; (1) the
plaintiff is a member of a special class for whose benefit the statute was
created, (2) the legislative intent was to create a private remedy,
(3) the implied remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme, and
(4) the cause of action is not relegated to state law, or encompassed by
an area that is basically the concern of the states, where it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law. 138
Applying the factors to section 504, the Lloyd court found that the
plaintiffs, as handicapped persons, were among the special class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted. 39 The legislative intent of sec-
tion 504 was next interpreted and applied in the same manner as the
United States Supreme Court decisions affecting Title VI, including the
right to bring a private action. 40 The implied remedy was found to be
consistent with the purpose of the legislative scheme in that the stated
purpose of section 504 was to enforce statutory and regulatory stan-
dards. 141 Finally, the cause of action was interpreted to concern the
enforcement of federally created rights and thus would not be the kind
of suit traditionally relegated to state law; 42 Congress intended to deal
135. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
136. Id at 1285-87. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. §2000d (1976). Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 further requires that
no person. . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ....
20 U.S.C. §1681 (1976). Subsequent to the Lloyd opinion, Congress enacted a provision making
available to "any person aggrieved" by a Section 504 violation the "remedies, procedures and
rights set forth in title VI." See 29 U.S.C. §794a(2) (1976).
137. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
138. Id at 78. The United States Supreme Court, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), used
the Cori factors to determine that Congress intended to create a private right of action under Title
VI, even though the statute didn't expressly create the right. 422 U.S. at 78.
139. 548 F.2d at 1285.
140. Id at 1285-86. The Lloyd interpretation is consistent with the report from the Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee that stated that the purpose of Section 504 was to "provide
for administrative consistency. . . ease of implementation, and permit a judicial remedy through
a private action." 120 CoNG. REC. 30534 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS
6373, 6391.
141. 548 F.2d at 1286. The fact that Congress closely aligned Section 504 with Titles VI and
IX is indicative that the language was chosen for the purpose of creating a private right of action.
Id
142. Id at 1286-87.
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with the particular needs of handicapped individuals 143 on a national
level.'" The court, therefore, concluded that, because all four of the
Cort factors were satisfied, section 504 provided a private right of
action. 145
Part of the rationale for the Lloyd finding of a private right of action
was the lack of an effective administrative remedy, as an alternative
means of enforcing section 504. 146 Since Lloyd, Congress has amended
section 504 to provide expressly that the "administrative remedies, pro-
cedures and rights" available under Title VI are also applicable to sec-
tion 504.'14 Notwithstanding this legislative enactment, the
administrative remedies available to aggrieved persons under section
504 remain inadequate. 148 The purpose of the administrative remedies
under section 504 was to provide government agencies with a forum to
initiate proceedings to terminate funding for noncompliance, 149 and
were not meant to provide an effective remedy for individual
violations.
150
As has been shown,' although section 504 does not expressly pro-
vide a private right of action, Congress has implied that this remedy
143. One area of concern to Congress is the lack of adequate means of public transportation
for the handicapped. See note 166 infra.
144. 548 F.2d at 1286-87.
145. Id at 1287. The majority of courts have found a private right of action under Section
504. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); Davis v. Southeast-
ern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 397
(1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education,
461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
146. 548 F.2d at 1286-87.
147. See note 140 supra.
148. The D.H.H.S. filed an amicus brief in Whitaker v. Board of Higher Education, 461 F.
Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), stating that exhaustion of administrative remedies should not be re-
ired before a judicial remedy could be sought. See 4 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 86, 87 (1980).
he inadequacy of an administrative remedy for enforcement of a section 504 violation was also
an issue in the Kiing decision. The court found support for the arguments against requiring ex-
haustion of administrative remedies in the United States Supreme Court decision of Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Cannon Court held that, under the comparable
provisions of Title IX, exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required before an individ-
ual could fie a private action because the administrative remedies "did not afford individual
complainants adequate relief." See id at 706-08, n.41.
In Kling v. County ofLos Angeles, 633 F.2d 876 (1980), the court reasoned that since Congress
incorporated the administrative remedies of Title VI into section 504 having known of the Cannon
decision, and that the remedies for Title VI and Title IX violations are the same, Congress must
have intended that the Cannon decision apply to section 504. See id at 878. The inadequacy of
the administrative remedy as a method of enforcing individual rights under civil rights statutes is
evident if one examines the fact that under the comparable provisions of Title IX to date, not one
educational institution has been denied one dollar, although 600 schools have been cited for non-
compliance. See H. APPENZELLER & T. APPENZELLER, SPORTS AND THE COURTS 89 (1981).
149. See 548 F.2d at 1286-87.
150. There is an extensive delay between the original filing of a section 504 complaint and the
actual termination of funding for a section 504 violation. The Secretary of the D.H.H.S. must file
a full report with the House and Senate legislative committees having jurisdiction over the pro-
gram accused of a violation. See 45 C.F.R. §84.61 (1980) (adopting the administrative procedures
for enforcement of Title VI, 45 C.F.R. §§80.6-80.10 (1980)).
151. See notes 128-150 and accompanying text supra.
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will be available. This implication is confirmed by the fact that section
504 satisfies the four-part test for a private right of action set forth in
the United States Supreme Court decision in Cori v. Ash.152 In addi-
tion, it is unnecessary that individual plaintiffs exhaust the available
administrative remedies before bringing a private right of action in
California.
1 53
The attainment of a judicial remedy through a private right of action
will not, however, adequately protect the interests of the wheelchair
athletes seeking access to road racing events. At present it is uncertain
that the courts will be consistent in their application of the provisions
of section 504 to road racing. Whether wheelchair athletes are "quali-
fied" to participate in road racing events is a matter on which courts
may differ. Some courts also may decline to extend the definition of a
recipient of "federal financial assistance" to this form of activity.
Moreover, compelling the right to participation through the court pro-
cess would be contrary to the desire of the wheelchair athletes to estab-
lish a working rapport with race directors.
In the previous sections it was shown that the federal statute section
504 requires "recipients" of federal financial assistance to provide an
equal opportunity for disabled individuals "to obtain equal results,
gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement" as
non-disabled individuals and to have those results achieved in an inte-
grated setting. 154 The provisions of section 504 would require race di-
rectors to provide wheelchair athletes with an opportunity to
participate in road races that are not separate or different from those
provided to non-disabled individuals. 55 This comment will next dis-
cuss an alternative means of guaranteeing equal access to road races.
With this in mind, the right to participate under the equal protection
clause of the federal constitution will be analyzed.
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have extended fed-
eral equal protection guarantees to prohibit state-enforced racial dis-
crimination in the use of public recreational facilities.'5 6 Moreover, it is
the perspective of the federal courts that the fourteenth amendment
guaranty of the right to life, liberty and property is not reserved to
healthy able-bodied children and adults, but applies with even more
152. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
153. See Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
154. 45 C.F.R. §§84.22(b), 85.51(b)(1)(ii) (1980).
155. d §85.51(b)(2) (1980).
156. See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); New Orleans v. Barthe, 376 U.S. 189
(1964); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
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vigor to the physically handicapped.' 57 This judicial attitude lays a
foundation for the recognition of a right of participation in road racing
by individuals with physical disabilities. In order to establish whether
the fourteenth amendment guarantees the right to participate, certain
prerequisites must be met. Whether the preclusion of qualified wheel-
chair athletes from competing in road races conducted on public streets
constitutes a violation of the federal equial protection clause hinges on
two principal concerns, the existence of identifiable state action and
identification of the appropriate standard of review of state action de-
nying wheelchair participation in road races.
A. State Action: Finding a "Nexus"
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court suggest that pri-
vate persons and entities may be deemed state actors if the relationship
between the private entity and the public entity is such that the actions
of the private entity could be characterized as those of the state.15 8 The
Court will find this relationship when there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and the challenged action of the private entity. 159
The degree of interdependence required to satisfy the "sufficiently close
nexus" standard was characterized by Justice Clark in Burton v. Wil-
mington Park Authority 6 as aposition of interdependence between pri-
vate and public actors akin to a joint venture, whereby the government
agency would be equally responsible for the discriminatory choices of
the private actor. 6' In addition, the Court has resolved that the state
need not have expressly authorized the activities of its officials or repre-
sentatives, in that the state's failure to protect its citizens from infringe-
ments of their constitutional rights also constitutes "state action". 62
Persuasive arguments are made that state tolerance of private dis-
crimination in the use of public facilities also implies a violation of the
equal protection clause. 6 3 Justice Goldberg stated in Bell v. Mary-
land'64 that a right of access to places of public accomodation had been
recognized as a common law liberty that could not be denied by the
157. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318-22 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
158. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 569 (1974) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973));
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1969).
159. 419 U.S. at 351.
160. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
161. Id at 725.
162. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1973); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1148-61 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
163. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,297 n.17, 298 (1964); TRIBE,supra note 162, at 1152.
164. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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failure of the state to protect the right against private action which dis-
criminates against certain classes of individuals with respect to using
the public facilities.' Congress in drafting the fourteenth amendment
assumed that it would include the common law liberties among those
rights afforded equal protection.166 Thus, government tolerance of pri-
vate action that discriminates against certain classes of individuals in
the right of access to public facilities could be considered unlawful state
action. 167
In addition to recognizing an equal protection right of access to pub-
lic facilities, including recreational facilities, the courts also have recog-
nized a right of participation in professional and interscholastic
athletics. 6  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brenden v. In-
dependent School District 69 held that a Minnesota high school league,
a private voluntary nonprofit organization, violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment by implementing a rule that
precluded girls from participating with boys in noncontact interscholas-
tic athletics.'° The court found state action in the "tremendous public
interest in educational functions"'' and that the public school machin-
ery of the state was involved in the ultimate enforcement of the dis-
criminatory rule.
17 2
Under the standards enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court, it is apparent that a "sufficiently close nexus" exists between the
activities of the race director and the city or local political entity such
that the activities of the race director are fairly considered to be state
action. This relationship is empirically established by the relationship
between city government and the private entities that sponsor running
races, a relationship that is properly characterized as one of interdepen-
dence and joint venture. The normal course of events in a road race is
for the city to provide police officers for traffic and crowd control, in-
cluding the erection of barriers to block traffic. Frequently, the run-
ning event itself is co-sponsored by the local parks and recreation
departments. Additionally, both parties receive the monetary benefit of
165. See id at 286; Ttuan, supra note 162, at 1152-53.
166. 378 U.S. at 286; TRIBE, supra note 162, at 1152-53.
167. See TRIBE, supra note 162, at 1154.
168. See, ag., Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 3*47 U.S. 483 (1954); Dorsey v. State Athletic
Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. La. 1958), aft'd, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
169. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
170. Id at 1300.
171. Id at 1295. Additionally, the Court found that the plaintiff had standing to assert her
claim because the "plaintiffs' interest in participating in interscholastic sports is. . .substantial
and cognizable .... Thus, th[e] case is properly before a federal court.' Id at 1299.
172. Id at 1299. See also McDonald v. NC4A, 370 F. Supp. 625, 631 (C.D. Cal. 1974), hold-
ing that voluntary concurrence of the state or instrumentality of a state in a decision of a private
organization constitutes state action.
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the revenue generated by the consumer running population. 173 The
Sacramento Marathon, like a great many locally conducted road races,
is organized and conducted by a private sports shop. The advertise-
ment that the sport shop receives for conducting the race is extensive;
for instance, T-shirts are issued to competitors with the name of the
sports shop printed on the back. These races involve multiple elements
of the community in a common enterprise that benefits the city in the
form of increased community fellowship. For example, these races
usually have aid stations staffed by volunteers from the community that
provide runners with water and other forms of support. Not only do
the runners participate in the races but families and well wishers also
take part. Public officials also are known to make frequent appear-
ances at these running events.
The situation in publicly conducted road racing is analogous to
Brenden 74 in that "tremendous public interest" is generated in their
support, and the use of city facilities is necessary to conduct the events.
One of the reasons why there is a great deal of public support for these
road races is due to the fact that a large portion of the entry fees gener-
ated by these events is donated to public and private charities. 175
State action might also be found in the failure of local government to
take action to prevent discrimination in the use of public facilities.
176
The standard for determining whether inaction by the state in alleviat-
ing private discrimination amounts to discriminatory state action is
whether the action of the state would "demonstrate a significant ten-
dency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination."'1
7
This relationship is apparent in the conduct of cities and private race
directors. Locally conducted road races require the use of city streets,
the support of the local police and fire departments, and prior city ap-
proval. In addition, government failure to prohibit discrimination
against the handicapped in road races constitutes state action as im-
plied support of the infringement of the recognized common law right
of access to places of public accomodation.1
7 1
Thus, the activities of private race directors in discriminating against
qualified wheelchair athletes can fairly be characterized as state action
because of the position of interdependence between the race directors
173. See note 65 supra.
174. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1973).
175. In Sacramento alone in 1981 the charitable causes for which races were sponsored, in-
cluded to name but a few; an effort to end the killing of baby harp seals by Arctic poachers; the
reconstruction of a local hospital, and cancer research.
176. See notes 163-167 and accompanying text supra.
177. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973).
178. See notes 163-167 and accompanying text supra.
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and the city. Next, it is necessary to determine the appropriate level of
equal protection scrutiny to be applied to state action that discriminates
against handicapped individuals.
B. The Physically Disabled as a "Suspect" Class
Under the traditional equal protection analysis, laws that treat per-
sons similarly situated differently are presumptively valid if they bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. 179 No pre-
sumption of validity attaches to classifications based on criteria that
have been regarded as inherently suspect by the courts.'8 0 Classifica-
tions based on criteria considered suspect can withstand an equal pro-
tection challenge only if the classification is necessary to further a
compelling state interest, 8 1 and the state interest cannot be achieved by
less drastic or less restrictive means.
18 2
The characterization of the handicapped, including the physically
disabled, as a suspect class for purposes of equal protection review
hinges on whether these characteristics align with the recognized
"traditional" characteristics of suspect classifications. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,'I 3 the United States Supreme
Court outlined those characteristics considered to be "traditional indi-
cia" of suspectness:
[S]uch disabilities, or ... such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or ... such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.1
84
These indicia of suspectness clearly apply to the handicapped per-
son.' Virtually all handicapping conditions are disabilities by defini-
tion, 186 which, in addition to the physical, emotional or mental
179. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
180. 441 U.S. at 351; see 427 U.S. at 312; 411 U.S. at 60 (Stewart, J., concurring).
181. See 411 U.S. at 17; 427 U.S. at 312.
182. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 354 (1951); see Kuhn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
184. Id at 28.
185. Although the term "handicapped" can imply a wide variety of physical, mental and emo-
tional afflictions, it is proper to treat handicapped persons as a single class for purposes of legal
analysis because of the legal consequences that result from society labeling certain traits as
"handicaps". See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualcations of
HandicappedPersons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L.
Rav. 855, 858 n.21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burgdorfl. In addition, the physically disabled
have been treated as a separate class: through the use of such separate facilities as schools and
rehabilitation institutes, they have been encouraged to interact only with others of the same class.
See Symposium on the ights of the Handicapped, 50 TEMp. L.Q. 941, 946 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Symposium].
186. See note 17 supra.
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impairment, include those disabilities legally and socially imposed.187
Moreover, physical disabilities qualify as, in the parlance of the United
States Supreme Court, "immutable characteristic[s]," as are race, na-
tional origin, sex, and other characteristics "determined solely by acci-
dent of birth."'188  Statutory distinctions based on immutable
characteristics often relegate a class to inferior status without regard to
the actual capabilities of its individual members. 189  Historically, the
handicapped have been treated unequally by the normal members of
society. Handicapped persons have been segregated from the rest of
society both physically, in the form of separate education' 9" and insti-
tutionalization,' 9' and socially, because of societal prejudices concern-
ing the ability and behavior of handicapped persons.192 These patterns
of discrimination have extended into employment,
193 transportation 194
and the right to receive life-saving medical treatment.
195
Handicapped persons may properly be characterized as a "discrete
and insular minority,"' 96 in that they have systematically been denied
187. See generaly Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 857-59.
188. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
189. Id
190. Indeed many handicapped individuals have been completely excluded from receivin an
education. In 1972, some observers estimated that there were one million handicapped individu-
als of school age in the country who were totally excluded from public education programs. See
Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 869 n.96. Congress has taken additional steps to provide education to
all handicapped children with the passage of the Education for the Handicapped Act of 1974,
§611, 20 U.S.C. §1401 (1976).
191. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 887. "A description of the physical plan of a modem
day average institution for the retarded reveals that these facilities are little more than prisons."
See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 890.
192. Segregation of the physically disabled from the rest of society
has provoked and perpetuated a reaction among nonhandicapped persons that the hand-
icapped are inferior .... [N]o opportunity is provided for the disabled to rebut this
belief by demonstrating their actual capacities. The non-handicapped are able to mini-
mize contact with the handicapped and reduce tensions frequently caused by such
encounters.
Symposium, supra note 185, at 947. The uneasiness that a nonhandicapped person feels in the
presence of the handicapped springs from ignorance and a lack of contact with the handicapped.
Once the handicapped are integrated into social settings, the fear and discrimination surrounding
them will decrease. See B. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DIsABILITY-A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 254-
65(1960).
193. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 864. In 1975, it was estimated that only one-third of
blind persons of working age in this country had jobs. Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 864.
194. Judge Sorkin of New York, himself a handicapped person, described the plight of the
physically handicapped in transportation as follows:
The physically handicapped are de facto barred from using the city's subways and to an
only slighter degree from the city's surface transportation system. They are not merely
relegated to the back of the bus, they are totally excluded.
Sorkin, Equal Access to Equal Justice: .4 Civil Right for the Physicaly Handicapped, 78 CASE &
COMMENT 41, 41 (1973).
195. The New York Times estimated that unnecessary deaths of handicapped babies due to
the withholding of life-saving treatment number in the thousands each year. See N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1974, at 18, col. 4.
196. The famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
nA (1938) (emphasis added) indicated that it need not inquire into
[W]hetherprejudie against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
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access to the majoritarian political process.' 97 Handicapped persons
have difficulty reaching even the first stage in having their voices heard
in the political process because of physical and statutory barriers to the
casting of their ballots. Official neglect in the choice of polling places
may effectively prevent handicapped persons from voting because of
architectural barriers or the inability of these persons to obtain trans-
portation to and from the voting places. 9 ' In addition, most states
have laws that deny mentally ill persons the right to vote. 199 Based on
this pattern of societal discrimination, handicapped persons are prop-
erly characterizable as a "suspect class."'2°° Handicapped individuals
are saddled with disabilities that exceed those encountered by racial
minorities,20 ' and are far less politically powerful than most racial mi-
norities.202 Any classification that intentionally discriminates against
handicapped individuals as a class should require a suspect level of
equal protection scrutiny. Because it is conceivable, given the present
reluctance of the United States Supreme Court to recognize new per-
sonal rights,20 3 that the Court will not apply "suspect criteria" to classi-
fications based on handicap, this comment will also discuss the
which tends to seriously curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry.
John Ely suggests that the key to understanding the Supreme Court decisions finding particular
groups of individuals to have "suspect" class characteristics is the examination of whether the
group has been subject to societalpreudice. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUSr. A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-83 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as ELY]. Ely suggests that the Court is
primarily concerned with unconstitutional motivation in its review of state legislation under the
equal protection clause. Indeed, the purpose behind requiring that legislation affecting suspect
classes be "closely tailored to the object of the statute" and serve a substantial state interest is to
flush out unconstitutional motivations. Ely notes that prejudice has much to do with unconstitu-
tional motivations regarding treatment of particular classes of individuals. Therefore, closer judi-
cial scrutiny should be given to classifications affecting groups that have been subject to a history
of social prejudice to identify potentially unconstitutional motivations behind the legal classifica-
tions. See ELY, supra at 135-83. Handicapped persons have been subject to a great deal of socie-
tal prejudice. The concept of survival of the fittest, created by the Social Darwinists, has fostered
contempt and hostility toward the handicapped person, with the result that sterilization was ratio-
nalized as being in the interests of the individual. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 887.
197. Most mentally handicapped persons are denied the right to vote by express provisions in
state constitutions and statutes. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 906.
198. Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 906-07.
199. Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 906.
200. Judicial recognition of the handicapped as a suspect class has been isolated; the North
Dakota Supreme Court in In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1976), however, expressed confi-
dence that classifications based on the "immutable characteristics" of the handicapped would
have been considered suspect by the Rodriguez Court. Id at 446. The application of the criteria
of suspectness to classifications based on handicap has been the subject of strong, well-reasoned
commentary. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, 855-910; Krass, The Right to Public Education for
Handicapped Children: .4 Primerfor the New Adpocate, 1976 U. ILL L.F. 1016, 1037-42 (1976);
Comment, Jury Selection The Courts, The Constitution, and the Deaf, 11 PAC. L.J. 967, 982-88
(1980).
201. See notes 190-195 and accompanying text supra.
202. See notes 196-199 and accompanying text supra.
203. See Massachusett's Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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alternative application of lesser standards of review to classifications
based on handicap.
C Lesser Standards of Review
The United States Supreme Court decisions concerning classifica-
tions based on gender and illegitimacy indicate that individuals having
certain group characteristics are entitled to more "sensitive," or a




Classifications based on these "sensitive" characteristics must serve
important governmental interests and be substantially related to those
interests.2 °5 Classifications based on handicap will accordingly be ex-
amined to determine if characteristics attributable to the handicapped
properly fall within the purview of heightened level scrutiny. The im-
plication from the recent United States Supreme Court decisions of
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 206 and Frontiero v. Richardson
20 7
is that classifications based on immutable characteristics are "sensitive"
and require more exacting scrutiny than that provided under the tradi-
tional rational basis test.u0 8
The Court's position is based in part on the recognition that classifi-
cations based on traits such as race, gender and illegitimacy "frequently
[bear] no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. 2 0 9 In
addition, classifications disfavoring racial minorities and women have
been considered suspect because they "will be perceived as a stigma of
inferiority."210
The Court of Appeals in Brenden21' applied a heightened standard
of review, requiring a Minnesota high school league to show that its
exclusion of qualified high school girls from participating with boys in
noncontact sports was substantially related to an important state inter-
est.212 Recognizing that the class of women, like the class of men, in-
204. See note 208 infra.
205. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77, 92 (1971).
206. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
207. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
208. See Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals in
Medora characterized the standard of review under "sensitive but not suspect" classifications as
requiring at least rational basis scrutiny that is close and substantial. Id at 1154, 1155 n. 12. The
case dealt with a regulation of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare under which the
blind, aged or disabled could be declared ineligible for state assistance if they did not qualify for
federal assistance, a requirement that non-disabled individuals did not have to meet. Id at 1150-
52. The regulation was held to violate the federal equal protection clause. Id at 1155.
209. 411 U.S. at 686.
210. Id See also Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 19, 485 P.2d 529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 340 (1971); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1127 (1969).
211. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
212. Id. at 1302. The court justified its application of the heightened level of review on the
United States Supreme Court decision of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971), which applied
the standard to gender-based classifications.
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cludes individuals with widely different athletic abilities, the court held
that a state may not use outdated stereotypic assumptions about the
nature of females as a class to deny females an individualized determi-
nation of their qualifications for a benefit provided by the state.213
Congress has manifested increased sensitivity to classifications based
on race,214 sex, 215 and handicap.216 Arguably, Congress has thereby ex-
pressed its intention to place discriminatory practices against the handi-
capped on the same level of concern as those affecting race and
gender.217 Further evidence that classifications based on handicap may
be subject to the same equal protection standards of review as those
based on race or gender is found in the United States Supreme Court
decision of Regents of the University of Caiffornia v. Bakke.218  In
Bakke, Justice Brennan concurred with the majority that
Congress' equating of Title VI's prohibition with the commands of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its refusal precisely to define
that racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit, and its ex-
pectation that the statute would be administered in a flexible manner,
compel the conclusion that Congress intended the meaning of the
statute's prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the com-
mands of the Constitution.219
L Applying a Heightened Level of Scrutiny to the Handicapped
Handicapped individuals clearly meet the standards enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in determining "sensitive" classifica-
tions. Present societal notions of the abilities of handicapped persons
are largely based on outdated beliefs about the effect of a disability on
the ability to perform a given task.22 ° In Poole v. South Plainfield Board
of Education,22 the court explicitly rejected a school board argument
that risk of injury to the plaintiff was a sufficient justification to disal-
213. 477 F.2d at 1300.
214. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000d, 2000e (1976).
215. See 20 U.S.C. §1681; 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1976).
216. 29 U.S.C. §794 (1976).
217. Section 504 had its genesis in an abortive attempt by Congressman Vanik to include the
handicapped within the strictures of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977). The following excerpt from Joseph A. Califano's
Preamble to the Section 504 Regulations, further identifies the similarities between section 504
and Title's VI and IX:
the language of 504 is almost identical to the comparable non-discrimination provisions
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972. It establishes a mandate to bring handicapped persons into the mainstream of
American life.
See FEDERAL PROGRAMs ADVISORY SERVICE, HANDICAPPED REQUIREMENTS HANDBOOK, App.
IHIB at l:i (1980).
218. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
219. Id at 340.
220. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1973).
221. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
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low his participation.222 The court maintained that it was this type of
paternalism that section 504 was designed to prevent.223 In addition,
the court found that the stigma associated with persons who are handi-
capped may "generate a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."224
Classifications based on handicap contain those essential characteris-
tics of sensitive classifications that require the state to justify the classi-
fication with a substantial state interest. Handicapping conditions are
"immutable" and frequently bear no relation to an individual's ability
to function in a particular context. This is especially the case in wheel-
chair road racing when the individuals involved train diligently to meet
the physical demands of road racing. Congress also has expressed its
intent that discrimination against the handicapped be given judicial
scrutiny of the same magnitude afforded classifications based on gender
and illegitimacy.
2. The Rational Basis Standard
Even if the United States Supreme Court holds true to its recent line
of decisions granting state legislatures a great deal of deference in the
area of social - legislation,22 5 thus maintaining its static posture in the
recognition of new areas of personal rights, 226 any classification must
still rationally relate to a legitimate government objective.227 A classifi-
cation excluding wheelchair athletes from participating in road races
would fail even the minimum standard rational basis test.
The Brenden22 court, in evaluating a high school league's interests in
excluding female participation on male teams in non-contact interscho-
lastic athletics, found that the league had failed to show a "sufficient
rational basis for [its] conclusion that women are incapable of compet-
ing with men in non-contact sports. '229 The court stated that the class
of women, like the class of men, includes individuals of widely differing
222. Id at 953-54.
223. Id
224. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483-94 (1954). A person whose condition need not be
a substantial impediment may become "handicapped" through societal labeling of a personal
characteristic as a handicap. Educators and psychologists use the term "self-fulfilling prophecy"
to describe a process whereby persons assigned stigmatizing labels tend to conform to the expecta-
tion created by the labels. See Burgdorf, supra note 185, at 858.
225. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973); Kelso, Justice
O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitutional Cases? 13 PAC. L.J. 259, 260
(1982).
226. See note 175 supra.
227. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1974).
228. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
229. Id at 1300.
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abilities, and that the league had failed to show any objective non-dis-
criminatory standards for evaluating individual qualifications for non-
contact interscholastic athletics.23° The Brenden rationale is equally
applicable to the exclusion of wheelchair athletes from road racing,
which presents an analogous factual situation. The requirements for
entering a road race do not contain any objective criteria that would
justify the exclusion of wheelchair competitors from road races. Stan-
dard entry forms simply require that the participant certify that he or
she is fit and able to complete the race;23' neither of these requirements
would exclude qualified wheelchair athletes from participation.
232
A race director has two legitimate goals in organizing a race: to pro-
vide competition that is challenging and satisfying to a broad range of
athletes of varying abilities, and to ensure that the competition takes
place under safe and orderly conditions. Exclusion of wheelchair ath-
letes is not rationally related to either of these goals.
In the larger road races, 233 race directors meet their first objective by
separating individuals according to running ability at the starting line
through the use of staggered starts. Either the better runners are started
at the starting line, and the other runners behind them, or the runners
are separated into groups based on each runner's average pace per
mile, or both. Similarly, the use of staggered starts has been employed
effectively in those events in which wheelchair participation has been
allowed. The wheelchair competitors are given anywhere from a one-
to fifteen-minute head start, depending on the number of runners, the
number of wheelchair participants, the length of the course, and the
nature of the terrain.2 34 Through the use of staggered starts any crowd-
ing at the start because of runners or wheelchairs trying to avoid other
runners or wheelchairs is eliminated. By the time the runners catch up
with the chairs, if they do, the wheelchair participants are sufficiently
spread out that no obstacle is presented to the runners; this ensures that
the runners' times will not be impeded by having to slow down and
change direction for a wheelchair."
230. Id
231. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
232. See notes 107-109 and accompanying text supra.
233. Examples are the New York, Boston, Orange Bowl (Florida) and Sacramento Marathons.
234. Telephone Interview with Dino Wallen, Vice President of the C.W.A.A., Jan. 7, 1982
(notes on file at the Pacflc Law Journal) [hereinafter referred to as Phone Conversation with Dino
Wallen].
235. The wheelchair road racing population as a whole also abides by certain "rules of the
road" which are emphasized by the I.W.R.A. and the C.W.A.A. One such rule is that wheelchair
participants stay to the far left-hand side of the road because runners usually run on the right-
and side, though the entire street is fair game. In addition, wheelchair participants are to call out
"wheelchair" about 30-35 feet from a runner to alert the runner as to the wheelchair's presence,
and as to which side the chair will pass the runner on. Another rule of the road is that wheelchair
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The race director's second major interest, that of ensuring safe com-
petition, is also consistent with wheelchair participation. The record to
date indicates that wheelchair participation in road racing has not re-
sulted in a significant safety threat to either wheelchair participants or
their ambulatory counterparts.236 Indeed, the likelihood of a runner
being struck by a car on the race course.is greater than that of colliding
with a wheelchair.237 Moreover, wheelchair participants are at least as
cautious as runners in avoiding collisions with runners and other obsta-
cles because of the greater risk of injury in being thrown from a
wheelchair. 8
In sum, the total exclusion of wheelchair participation in road racing
would be unreasonable discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment, in that a race director's legitimate goals in maintaining a safe and
competitive race are not reasonably promoted by this exclusion. Judi-
cial enforcement of the right to participate on a case-by-case basis,
however, is an inadequate means of protecting the rights of wheelchair
participants, as inconsistent decisions would undoubtedly result.239
Grounds for differing judicial opinion may arise on the relative degree
of public participation in the form of state or local assistance that is
necessary to implicate the "state action" requirement for these activities
to be scrutinized under the equal protection clause.240 The appropriate
standard of scrutiny under the federal and state equal protection
clauses concerning classifications based on handicap would differ
among the states according to the varying interpretations of relevant
state constitutional guarantees.
The wheelchair athletes seek a timely and concerted effort by race
directors to ensure their harmonious participation with the able-bodied
runners.241 Inconsistent judicial resolution of the rights of wheelchair
participants are to give the right of way to runners. See Phone Conversation with Dino Wallen,
note 234 Matra.
236. See note 71 supra. Another incident occurred after the completion of a different race
when a runner stopped immediately after crossing the finish line, contrary to normal safe proce-
dure (these collisions will occur even between runners when the finish line area is not kept clear).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 27, New York Roadrunners Club v. Division of Human Rights, 81
A.D.2d 519, 437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981) (filed by Richard Raymond, Attorney for the I.W.R.A.)
(copy on fie at the Pacc Law Journal).
237. See Phone Conversation with Phil Carpenter, note 22 supra. Cars are often given a lane
of travel on race courses, a practice which on numerous occasions has resulted in collisions be-
tween runners and automobiles. Marathons and other road races are subject to inevitable safety
hazards such as weather, road conditions, the inexperience of other runners, and even an occa-
sional dog attack of a participant. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 27, 81 A.D.2d 519, 437 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1981) (fied by Richard Raymond, Attorney for the I.W.R.A.) (notes on file at the Pac)jfc Law
Journal).
238. See Phone Conversation with Dino Wallen, note 234 .supra.
239. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
240. See notes 158-167 and accompanying text supra.
241. See POSITION PAPER, supra note 7, at 2-3; Phone conversation with Phil Carpenter, note
22 supra.
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athletes could inhibit these efforts by race directors because of uncer-
tainty about appropriate methods of integration, or concerning whether
integration is required at all.
The right of wheelchair athletes to participate in locally conducted
road races is supported by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the fourteenth amendment. This comment will next turn to
whether any additional protection of the wheelchair athlete's right to
participate in road racing is provided by California law.
IDENTIFYING A RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
The analysis of the wheelchair athlete's right to participate in road
racing under California law will focus on rights conferred on handi-
capped persons by California statutory and constitutional law. Specifi-
cally, this section will analyze Civil Code sections 54 and 54.1 and the
equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution.
.4. The Application of Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1
1. Guaranteeing a Public Right of Access
California has assured all handicapped persons a specific right of ac-
cess to public streets, walkways and highways, and to all places where
the general public is invited.242 Civil Code Section 54 provides that
... visually handicapped persons, and other physically disabled
persons shall have the same right as the able-bodied to the full and
free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, . . . public
facilities, and other public places.
243
In addition, Civil Code Section 54.1 states that
... physically disabled persons shall be entitled to full and equal
access, as other members of the general public, to ... places of pub-
lic accomodation, amusement or resort, and other places to which the
general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limita-
tions established by law .. .44
Whether these statutes can be interpreted to extend to discrimination
against handicapped persons in road racing events depends on whether
the legislative meaning attached to the word "public place" is broad
enough to include road races conducted on public streets to which the
general public is invited. The California cases interpreting the intent of
the legislature in this respect have given a broad construction to the
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term "public place." '245 In Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc. ,246 the
California Second District Court of Appeal determined that a facility is
considered "public" if it is open to common use.2" 7 In Askew v
Parker ,248 a private pool owner was held to have made a public use of
the pool, subjecting it to state health inspection laws, by inviting all
teenage children in the community to use the pool free of charge.249
The Askew court noted that the meaning of the term "public" varied
with the subject to which it was applied, interpreting the term broadly
when it involves matters threatening health or public safety.250
Although the New York Court of Appeals in New York Roadrunners
Club v. Division of Human Rights251' disagreed with the State Human
Rights Appeal Board that the race director had engaged in unlawful
discrimination by excluding wheelchair participation in the New York
Marathon, the court did find that a marathon course was a "place of
public accomodation" within the meaning of the New York statute.25 2
The California Supreme Court decision of Marsh v. Edwards Thea-
tres Circuit, Inc. 253 is the leading California case interpreting the statu-
tory requirements for nondiscrimination in places of public
accomodation. The court initially noted that the "federal anti-discrimi-
nation statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion or national origin in places of public accomodation are no
broader in application" than are California statutes; thus, a plaintiff
who pleads a violation of the federal civil rights statute will not prevail
if the claim of discrimination in a place of public accomodation is not
supported by California law.' 4 The plaintiff in Marsh, a quadraplegic
245. See Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510-12, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490,
493-95 (1960); Askew v. Parker, 151 Cal. App. 2d 759, 762, 312 P.2d 342, 344 (1957).
246. 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490.
247. Id at 510-12, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 493-95.
248. 151 Cal. App. 2d at 759, 312 P.2d at 342.
249. Id at 762-63, 312 P.2d at 344-45.
250. Id
251. See New York Roadrunners Club v. Division of Human Rights, 81 A.D.2d 519, 437
N.Y.S.2d 681 (1981).
252. 81 A.D.2d 519 at 519; N.Y. Exac. LAW §292(9). Specifically the statute states that
The opportunity to ... the use of places of public accomodation. . . without discrimi-
nation because of race, creed, color or national origin ... is hereby . . declared to be a
civil right. See N.Y. Exac. LAW §291(2).
The term "place of public accomodation, resort or amusement" includes "race courses, skating
rinks, amusement and recreation parks. . . ." Id §292(9).
253. 64 Cal. App. 3d 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976).
254. Id at 885, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The federal statute reads, "All persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and ac-
comodations of any place of public accomodation .... 42 U.S.C. §2000a (1976). Federal statu-
tory jurisdiction is invoked by the operation of a place of public accomodation "if its operations
affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action." Id
§2000a(b). Operations affect commerce if the "customarily present. . . athletic. . . exhibitions,
or other sources of entertainment . . . move in commerce." Id §2000a(c). The United States
Supreme Court has held that under the meaning of the statute, "other places of entertainment
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confined to a wheelchair, commenced an action against a private thea-
ter owner alleging that the latter's refusal to allow him to remain in his
wheelchair in the theater aisle unlawfully discriminated against him
under the California civil rights statutes.2 5 5 The defendant's justifica-
tion for his refusal, accepted by the court, was that since fire regulations
do not permit anyone to sit in the aisles,256 discrimination in this con-
text was not unreasonable.2 57 Therefore, under Marsh, though a pri-
vate theater was held to be a place of public accomodation,
handicapped persons could be excluded when the interests of public
safety and health were at stake.
2 Wheelchair Participation under Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1
Under the broad construction given the meaning of the word "public
place" by the California courts,2 58 the eventual recognition that mara-
thon courses are "places to which the general public is invited" seems
likely for several reasons. Ordinarily, no restrictions are placed on par-
ticipation in road races by members of the general public. In addition,
that these races are run on public streets, and that police officers are
necessary to direct the flow of traffic for the protection of participants,
suggest that road racing is a "public" activity under Civil Code Section
54.1. There is no countervailing state law, as was the case in Marsh,
that would permit exclusion of wheelchair participation. 59 Even the
existence of such a countervailing law would not mitigate the protec-
tion by Civil Code Section 54 of the right of handicapped persons to
"full and free access to public places .'260 Exclusion of wheelchair par-
ticipation from road racing open to the public would thus violate the
terms of Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1, and would subject the of-
fender to misdemeanor liability.261 At present, however, there is no
guarantee that the courts will construe Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1
includes direct participation in some sport or activity" and that Congress intended that the word
1ace of entertainment" be interpreted broadly according to its generally accepted meaning. See
iel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306(1969). The statute, by its terms, would apply to either or both
large-scale annual running events that draw runners from out of state and events that advertise in
running magazines intending to attract out-of-state runners. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 846.
255. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The plaintiff claimed that Civil Code
Section 51, prohibiting discrimination in business establishments, should have applied to his case.
The court denied this contention, stating that the provisions of Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1
were his exclusive remedy. Id at 889, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
256. Id at 886, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
257. Id at 891, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
258. See notes 245-250 and accompanying text s'upra.
259. See note 256 and accompanying text supra.
260. CAL. CIV. CODE §54.
261. See id §54.3. Any person or entity who interferes with the right of access of a physically
disabled person to public facilities or places under Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1 is liable for
any actual damages incurred by the plaintiff and up to $1,000 in punitive damages. Id
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to apply to road races conducted on public streets. Litigation of the
interests of wheelchair athletes under present California statutes there-
fore remains subject to the same disadvantages cited earlier:262 a lack
of standardized procedures and inconsistent holdings, that would leave
race directors uncertain as to the most appropriate method of integra-
tion. The recognition of a right of participation by statute is preferable
to judicial interpretation of existing statutory and constitutional guar-
antees as a means of ensuring effective wheelchair participation.
Although the existing language of Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1
limits the degree to which they can provide a reliable means of wheel-
chair participation in road racing, this shortcoming could be remedied
by amending these sections to provide standardized procedures for par-
ticipation. Specific guidelines for wheelchair participation will subse-
quently be recommended for legislative incorporation into the existing
Civil Code sections.
Having found that a statutory recognition of the right of participa-
tion under the California Civil Code would be appropriate, this com-
ment will next examine equal protection under the California
Constitution. This will determine whether the scope of the constitu-
tional guaranty would extend to participation by handicapped persons
in athletic events that are held open to the general public.
B. The Equal Protection Guaranty of the Right to Participate Under
California Law
Article 1, section 7, of the California Constitution provides that "a
person may not be. . .denied equal protection of the laws." '263 While
the California Supreme Court has generally followed the United States
Supreme Court in its equal protection analysis, 264 it has occasionally
recognized "suspect" classifications and "fundamental" rights when the
High Court has not.265
The California Supreme Court in Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby2 66 held
that classifications based on gender are inherently suspect, particular y
when those classifications are made with respect to fundamental inter-
262. See notes 154, 158-167 and accompanying text supra.
263. CAL. CONST. art. 1, §7.
264. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.1 1,487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
609 n.lI (1971).
265. See, e.g, 5 Cal. 3d at 584,487 P.2d at 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 601 (education a fundamental
right); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (sex a "suspect"
classification). Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (sex not accorded "suspect" classification
treatment); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a fundamen-
tal right).
266. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329.
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ests.267 The court described suspect classifications as those based on
immutable traits: characteristics that are usually fortuitous by circum-
stances of birth, often bearing no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society.268 A second factor used by the court in determining
"suspectness" was whether the classification carried with it the "stigma
of inferiority and second class citizenship.
'2 69
Additionally, the California Constitution guarantees individuals cer-
tain inalienable rights that "are not dependent on those guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States";2 70 among those rights are "en-
joying and defending life and liberty,. . and pursuing and obtaining
. . . happiness. '271 Specifically, the California Legislature has granted
to individuals with developmental disabilities the "right to social inter-
action and participation in community activities" and "a right to physi-
cal exercise and recreational opportunities.27 2
Handicapped individuals certainly are characterized by those traits
identified by the California Supreme Court as indicative of the identifi-
able traits that confer "suspect" status on a group. Physical disabilities
and other handicapping conditions are immutable characteristics, as
they comprise a status into which the class members are often "locked
by the accident of birth '273 and are often unrelated to the actual ability
of those individuals to contribute to society. The ongoing denial to
handicapped individuals of the opportunity to become productive
members of society274 and the continued reinforcement of the stereo-
type of handicapped individuals as inferior will only serve to imprint
further in their minds the futility of trying to improve themselves.
California recognizes that suspect classifications made with respect to
fundamental interests are especially deserving of strict scrutiny. Ar-
guably, the freedom to pursue a happier and more healthful existence
through participation in athletics could be considered a fundamental
interest in California; the importance accorded the right of handi-
capped individuals to participate in community activities and engage in
physical exercise is manifested by the legislative codification of these
important interests.275 A classification prohibiting handicapped per-
267. Id at 20, 485 P.2d at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
268. Id at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
269. Id at 19, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
270. CAL. CONST., art. I, §24.
271. Id art. 1, §1.
272. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§4502(f), (g).
273. 5 Cal. 3d at 18, 485 P.2d at 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
274. One scholar has summarized the current practices resulting from discrimination as the
unwillingness to grant the disabled "normal" social interaction that would allow them to become
integrated into the "normal" society. See generally C. SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD, THE SOCIOLOGY
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DisABrry AND REHABILrrATION 4 (1970).
275. See notes 270-272 and accompanying text supra.
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sons from participating in road racing thereby limits the exercise of a
fundamental right by a class of individuals having the characteristics of
a suspect class; this exclusion would be improper, absent a compelling
state interest. Enforcement of the right to participate under the Cali-
fornia equal protection clause would be subject, however, to the same
uncertainties and inconsistencies as would be experienced in attempt-
ing to enforce participation on a case-by-case basis under the federal
equal protection clause.
CONCLUSION
This comment has shown that existing state and federal constitu-
tional and statutory law entitle qualified wheelchair athletes to partici-
pate in running events conducted on public streets. First, section 504 of
the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applies to all road races on pub-
lic streets conducted by private race directors with the permission and
assistance of state agencies receiving federal funding. Accordingly,
under the provisions of section 504, qualified wheelchair athletes must
be allowed to participate in any such race, when this participation does
not require substantial modification of the event.
Second, exclusion of wheelchair athletes from these events would vi-
olate both federal and state equal protection clauses. Last, the provi-
sions of Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1 prohibiting discrimination
against handicapped persons in the use of "streets, walkways. . . and
other places to which the general public is invited"27 6 should be inter-
preted to include running events conducted on public streets to which
the general public is invited to participate.
These laws do not, however, serve to protect adequately the wheel-
chair athlete's right of participation. Attempting to achieve integrated
participation in road racing through the judicial enforcement of ex-
isting statutory and equal protection guarantees would result in the in-
consistent application of existing legal doctrine. A case-by-case
adjudicative approach to seeking legal guarantees of the wheelchair
athlete's right to participate in road racing would also inhibit the ability
of race directors and wheelchair athletes to establish standardized pro-
cedures for the safe and effective integration of wheelchair participants.
Alternatively, amending California Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1 to
specifically include road racing conducted on public streets as a place
"to which the general public is invited" would ensure that the right to
participate will be recognized by race directors, and would promote
276. CAL. CIV. CODE §§54, 54.1.
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important policy concerns of the California legislature regarding the
physically disabled.
The availability to the wheelchair athlete of locally conducted run-
ning events presents an invaluable opportunity to California to miti-
gate the present lack of organized athletic events for the physically
disabled. 7 In addition, the legal recognition of a right of participation
would promote the federal and state policy of mainstreaming disabled
individuals into normal community settings.2 7 Community attitudes
toward the disabled would be favorably altered, and the awkwardness
that able-bodied members of society feel toward the physically disabled
would diminish because of increased awareness of the physical capabil-
ities of the disabled individual.
In addition to amending Civil Code Sections 54 and 54.1 to specifi-
cally recognize a right of participation by wheelchair athletes in run-ning events conducted on public streets, the following guidelines for
participation should also be incorporated into these Civil Code sec-
tions. Prior to issuing a race permit to a race director, the public entity
responsible for issuing the permit should ascertain that the race director
has consulted with the local chapter of the National Wheelchair Ath-
letic Association to determine if wheelchair participation in the event
would be feasible. In addition, the "Race Director Guidelines for Par-
ticipation"'279 promulgated by the International Wheelchair Roadracers
Association should be adopted by the legislature as the standard guide-
lines for ensuring safe and effective wheelchair participation in road
racing. These guidelines are the culmination of years of experience
gained from actual participation by wheelchair athletes in road racing,
and accurately reflect the necessary standards for safe participation. As
an added qualification, the race director should be required to provide,
and the wheelchair athletes required to submit to, a safety inspection of
their chairs by a person qualified to conduct this sort of inspection.
The recognition by the California Legislature and the courts that sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Civil Code Sections 54 and
54.1 and the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitu-
tions prohibit discrimination against qualified wheelchair athletes in
running events conducted on public streets would properly reflect and
277. See note 10 supra.
278. Both state and federal governments now pursue the goal of total integration of handi-
capped persons into the mainstream of society. The California Legislature declares that "[ilt is the
policy of this state to encourage and enable disabled persons to participate fully in the social and
economic life of the state. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §19230a; In re Marriage of Carney, 24
Cal. 3d 725, 740, 598 P.2d 36, 44, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (1979).
279. See Race Director Guidelines for Participation (Jan. 21, 1982) (unpublished guidelines
from the I.W.R.A.).
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apply the philosophy and scope of those laws, but would produce un-
certain results. Alternatively amending Civil Code Sections 54 and
54.1 to include running events conducted on public streets as "public
places," where discrimination against the handicapped will not be tol-
erated, will: (1) further the interests served by these statutes, by pro-
viding handicapped individuals with equal access to places where the
general public is invited; (2) promote the legislative goal of main-
streaming the handicapped into the community setting; and (3) pro-
vide an opportunity for the physically disabled to achieve a sense of
satisfaction and self-worth through athletic participation.
David D. Carico
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